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(old. 370. seems also to be in conflict with Hammond v. The
State, and so far as they and similar cases in Coldwell's Reports
are opposed to the views presented in this opinion, are overruled.
The case of Foltrell and German, 5 Cold. 581, in which it was
held that a note executed by a Confederate surgeon for the rent of
a hospital building was not illegal and void as being in aid of the
rebellion, is approved, as far as it goes, and might, perhaps, be
rested on firmer grounds. The case of Wright and Cantrell v.
Overall, 2 Cold. 366, and other cases in which it was held that the
Confederate or rebel government was not a defacto government are
overruled, so far as they are not in unison with this opinion. The
doctrine that the rebels were insurgents merely, and that the gov-
ernment of the Confederate States of America was not a de facto
government involves, perhaps, the consequence that the United
States might be liable to foreign governments, and, possibly, to their
own citizens, for all their acts and liabilities, and we are not dis-
posed to yield our assent to a doctrine fraught with consequences
of such gravity and importance. Were it an original question, we
would, without hesitation, declare that a government which as-
sumed to form a Constitution, had a president and cabinet in actual
authority, a congress that enacted laws on most subjects of national
legislation, and published them in due form and enforced them ;
which was recognized as a belligerent power by two of the greatest
nations on earth ; was enabled to issue and keep afloata currency;
set on foot a navy that harrassed the commerce of the United
States throughout the world ; marshaled immense armies; fought
great battles, and kept the power of the United States at bay for
four years, was, to all intents and purposes, a de facto govern-
ment, and that it required n'o recognition on the part of the govern-
ment of the United States to establish a fact well known to millions
of people, and which will be transmitted to future ages in every
truthful history that has been or may be written of the war. But
for the present, we are satisfied to declare that Wright and Can-
trell v. Overall is in conflict with Thorington v. Smith, decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States, and reported in 8
Wal. 1-15, where the government of the Confederate States is
expressly held (pp. 9, 10) to have been a de facto government, or
at least, a government of paramount force.
Let the judgment of the Circuit Court in this case he reversed
and the cause remanded.
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ADMIRALTY.
Salvage of Government Property- What is Possession by the Gov.
ernment.-When the property of the government has been saved
from destruction by salvors, or by their sacrifices which are com-
1 From .. W. Wallace, Esq.; to appear in vols. 10 and 11 of his Reports.
2. From lion. X. L. Freeman, Reporler; to appear in 51 Ills. It-ports.
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pemsated by a contribution in general average, justice and sound
policy require that it should be held to bear its share of the bur
den which the maritime law imposes on all other property in like
condition: The Davis, 10 Wall.
Although no suit in rem can be maintained against the property
of the United States where it would be necessary to take such
property out of the possession of the government by writ or pro-
cess of the court, yet in the construction of this rule the possession
spoken of must be an actual possession, and not that mere con-
structive possession which is very often implied by reason of owner-
ship under circumstances favorable to such implication: Id.
The possession of the government can only exist through some of
its officeri, using that word in the sense of any person charged on
behalf of the government with the control of the property, coupled
with its actual possession: Id.
These principles applied, and the possession by the captain ot an
ordinary merchant vessel, on which cotton had been loaded at one
port by a treasury agent of the United States, to be delivered to
him or his assigns at another, Held, not to be possession of the gov-
ernment : and a libel to charge the cotton with salvage, sustained,
the services having been services in their nature salvage-services,
and a libel having issued and been served before the cotton was
delivered by the master, and while it was yet in his control: Id.
Salvage-In whose name libel filed-- Tug carrying Fire Engines
into Harbor where Vessel ison fire entitled to Salvage.-A libel for
salvage may be filed in the name of the master and owners of the
salving vessel, although the master may make no claim in his own
behalf, but contrariwise may disclaim: The Blackwall, 10 Wall.
A tug towing, under the direction of the fire department of a
city, fire engines commonly used on land, from a wharf into a
harbor where a vessel is on fire, and lying alongside of the burn-
ing vessel while the engines throw water upon her, is entitled to
salvage, the fire being successfully extinguished : Id.
The owners of the tug will not be deprived of salvage because
the representatives of the fire department have not made a claim
as co-salvers. A vessel owned by a corporation may be entitled
to salvage, the vessel being otherwise a salvor: The Camanche,
8 Wallace, 476, affirmed on this point: Id.
One-twentieth part of the value of the property saved allowed
to a tug carrying fire engines, and lying beside a burning vessel
while the engines, under the management of the fire department
of the town, worked them and extinguished the fire. This re-
versed a decree which had allowed a tenth for the salvage service: Id.
Non-prosecution of their claim by one set of salvors, enures to
the benefit of the owners of the vessel, and not to that of other
salvors who do prosecute their claim: Id.
COPYRIGHT.
A claim for arranging an elastic bed for printing designs is not
a claim for a design inder Act .irch 2, 1861, section eleven, but
a c!aim for a device; Clark v. Ii.-nsfeld, 11 Wall.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Conveyance--Notice of a Prior Conveyance.-Where a grantee
of land takes a deed to the same, with notice of a prior convey-
ance, not then recorded, he is not an innocent purchaser, but takes
subject to all the rights of the grantee under the prior convey-
ance: Bayles v. Young, 51 Ills.
And where such grantee, with notice, conveys to another, but
subsequent to the recording of the prior conveyance, such subse-
quent purchaser is chargeable with notice by the record: Id.
EVIDENCE.
Allegations and Proof- Variance.-" Com." and "Co.2 *re well
understood abbreviations of the word "Company," when u,4A as a
part of the name of a commercial firm: Keith v. Sturges, 51'Ills.
So, in an action by the assignee of a note made payable to
"Sturges & Com.," it was alleged that it was endorsed by "Stur-
ges & Com.," and the note produced in evidence was endorsed
"Sturges & Co.:" Held, there was no variance: Id.
Parol Evidence to Vary a Writing.-Parol evidence is .isad-
missible for the purpose of showing that other property, not n.
swering the written description in a mortgage, was intended to
be included by the mortgagor: Hutton v. Arnett, 51 Ills.
The principle is well settled, that a written instrument cannot
be varied by parol evidence. The instrument must speak for
itself, unless there be a latent ambiguity, which may be explained
by such evidence: Id.
The case of Myers v. Ladd, 26 Ills. 415, is not in confict with
this principle: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Divorce-Desertion-How Long.-The statute requires that
desertion shall continue, without cause, for the space of two years,
before a divorce can be obtained in this State for that cause, and
courts have no power to prescribe a shorter period: Thomas v.
Thomas, 51 Ills.
The statute does not confer upon the courts an unlimited dis-
cretion to groat divorces whenever they may deem it expedient or
advisable. Their power to act is derived solely from the statute,
and they must conform strictly to its requirements: Id.
In a suit for divorce on the ground of adultery, the evidence
simply showed that the defendant frequently left her home in the
absence of her husband, who was a trader, and would be absent
several days at a time, and that her reputation for chastity was
bad: Held, that this proof failed to establish the charge: Id.
Larceny-Husband or Wife (Uonz.erting the Property of the other.
-- The act of 1861, known as the "Married Woman's Law," has
not so far destroyed the relation of husband and wife as to render
either guilty of larceny by converting the property of the other: Id.
It is no ground for a divorce, within the statute, that a party
has committed a larceny, where no conviction has be4n had: Id.
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The statute declares, that, to be a cause of divorce, the party
must be convicted of felony, or other infamous crime: Id.
And a court has no authority to convict a defendant, ex parte,
upon a default, of a felony or infamous crime, and then make such
conviction the basis of a decree of divorce: Id.
INSURANCE.
Endorsement on Policy that Payment to be made to a Third Party.
-The mere endorsement by a party assured, on a policy, "Payable
in case of loss to E. C. B.," which endorsement he signs, does not,
of itself, and necessarily, convey the idea of a sale of the property
insured. It may properly enough indicate nothing more than that
in case of loss the insurance money is to be paid to E. C. B.
Hence, a subsequent endorsement by the company's agent, "Con-
sent is hereby given to the above endorsement," does not neces-
sarily give an assent to-a sale of which the agent had no knowl-
edge, and of which it is not shown that any officer of the company
had notice: Bales v. Equitable Ins. Co., 10 Wall.
This view applied to a policy with particular provisions about a
vacation of the policy on a sale of the property; to a return of a
proportionate part of premium, and to a continuance of the policy
for the benefit of the purchaser in case of a sale to which.the com-
pany should give its consent by endorsement on the policy: Id.
INTEREST.
Unreasonable and Vexatious Delay of Payment.-In an action
to recover for the value of a quantity of corn loaned by the plain-
tiff to the defendant, interest is recoverable only upon the ground
that there has been an unreasonable and vexatious delay of pay-
ment: Davis v. Kenaga, 51 Ills.
And, in such case, it is error for the court to instruct the jury
that they may allow interest, because the question, whether there
has been an unreasonable and vexatious delay of payment, is one
of fact for the jury: Id.
TROVER.
Action of- Who can Maintain.-The doctrine is well settled,
that the action of trover may be maintained by a naked bailee.
And equally so by a pledgee for value; and; as this court has
said. one in such position may loan the property pledged, tempo-
rarily, to the pledgor, for a special purpose, and recover in trover,
if the property be not returned to him: Hutton v. Arnett, 51 Ills.
By an arrangement between A and D, D sold and turned out to
A certain cattle, to secure the payment of $85 borrowed money, the
property to be A's until the debt was paid, D to have until a day
specified to pay it. Afterward, A loaned the cattle to D, tempo-
rarily, and for a specific purpose, D agreeing to re-deliver to him:
Held, that this transaction amounted to a conditional sale of the
property, and D failing to restore it, after the purpose was fulfilled
for which it was loaned, A could recover in trover: Id.
